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The L’Aquila earthquake case is not “science on trial”. It is a
challenge to the way public officials communicate risk.
by Blog Admin
Last week six scientists and a former government official were sentenced to imprisonment
for their reassurances about safety prior to the 2009 earthquake in L’Aquila which killed over
300 people. While many commentators have expressed deep concern that this is a case of
‘science on trial’, Julien Etienne  and Tommaso Palermo contend that the trial is one of
public communication. They argue that in countries such as Italy, officials have sometimes
downplayed natural or technological risks to reassure the public, at little cost to themselves
if they happened to be wrong. The L’Aquila trial and verdict may be a sign that this is now
changing.
On the 23rd of  October, an Italian court sentenced six scientists and a f ormer
government of f icial to six years imprisonment in relation to the earthquake that killed
more than 300 people in L’Aquila in April, 2009. According to the prosecutors and the
f amilies of  the victims, the accused f ailed to evaluate and then communicate the potential
risk to the population. Specif ically, their alleged negligence is related to a public meeting
held in the city of  L’Aquila on the 31st of  March 2009, where the six scientists had been
asked to provide expert advice on the situation in L’Aquila. The meeting came af ter weeks of  tremors and
warnings of  a f orthcoming major earthquake propagated by a local amateur seismologist, which caused
alarm in the population.
This trial has been widely labelled a ‘trial of  science’ which resonates universally. It has been implied that
the judgement has f ound human responsibility in a natural disaster: a ‘medieval’ and ‘chilling’ connection.
However, it seems that this interpretation ignores key f acts of  the case, and contrary to much media
coverage, we do not see a universal case of  ‘science on trial.’ We rather f ind elements of  national or
regional peculiarity.
Firstly, the nature of  the charges has been misrepresented in the media as a f ailure to predict an
earthquake. But the accusation ref ers to unreasonable reassurances given by the six scientists, part of
a ‘major risks’ advisory expert panel, and the government of f icial that communicated to the media on that
day. The nature of  the ‘unusual’ meeting is also important. Contrary to established practice, the meeting
was held in L’Aquila and open to the public. It was rather short and actions to be undertaken were not
discussed. No f ormal statement was released af ter the meeting, while the minutes of  the meeting were
not prepared until af ter the earthquake had occurred. A press conf erence and interviews with the
government of f icial were the only public comments to emerge immediately af ter the meeting.
A central element in the dispute is an ‘optimistic’ interview given by the government of f icial af ter the
meeting. He argued that the ‘scientif ic community’ conf irmed that the multiple tremors were a good sign
as energies were being discharged instead of  piling up. This assertion has been strongly disputed, even
by the convicted scientists during the trial. New evidence suggests that the Head of  Civil Protection (the
direct superior of  the convicted government of f icial) had this idea in mind bef ore the meeting took place.
Investigators heard him (at the time his phone was tapped because of  investigations in a corruption
probe) to make clear that the message ‘the more tremors, the less danger’ had to be conveyed to the
local population as an indisputable scientif ic f act.
Finally, a (now popular) video shows the convicted government of f icial invit ing the cit izens of  the area to
stay calm. Prompted by the journalist, in what was intended as a joke, the government of f icial suggested
having a glass of  wine. The evidence suggests that the repeated government reassurances led a number
of  f amilies to stay in their houses when a tremor shook L’Aquila late into the night on April 5, just a
couple of  hours bef ore the major earthquake struck the city.
From the above it emerges that the meeting of  experts was a staged public relations exercise to
reassure the population. In that sense, the L’Aquila trial is a trial of  public communication, to which
scientists took part, possibly without f ully realising what they were getting into. Their presence at L’Aquila
seems crucial: without them ‘on board’, the reassuring words of  the government of f icial might not have
carried as much weight. Indeed, the key accusation is that the scientists f ailed to provide
recommendations f or community preparedness in case of  an earthquake. This is one of  the reasons why
there are members of  the international seismologist community who have also been crit ical of  the Italian
seismologists.
The absence of  a f ormal statement af ter the meeting and the ambiguous nature of  the meeting minutes
(if  prepared only af ter the earthquake actually occurred) contradict an inf luential body of  research
showing how organisations of  all kinds have become increasingly preoccupied with the production of
written accounts to prove, if  need be, that proper procedures are f ollowed. The question is why this
happened in the case of  L’Aquila. Is it a matter of  individual negligence? Or are country-specif ic f actors at
play here? Indeed, most of  the literature on the expansion of  written f orms of  accountability ref ers to
the Anglo-Saxon world. As put by an interviewee in an on-going CARR project on risk culture, the need to
write everything down in terms of  processes and evidence might be an ‘English disease’.
It is also the attitude of  government of f icials (and perhaps of  scientists too) towards public demands f or
inf ormation that suggests country- level specif icity. In some countries government of f icials will prepare
the public f or the worst so as to avoid blame in case the worst case actually happens (e.g. in London in
preparation f or public transportation problems during the Olympics, or in New York ahead of  Hurricane
Sandy). Yet in other countries government of f icials might also believe that their job is to reassure the
public: French state of f icials downplayed the risks of  the Chernobyl radioactive cloud; similarly Italian
of f icials downplayed the risks of  an earthquake in L’Aquila. Accountability systems in these countries
have long made such statements mostly ‘risk-f ree’ f or those who made them. The trial of  L’Aquila might
be a sign that t imes have changed.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and
Policy, nor of the London School of Economics. 
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